How will the carbon pricing mechanism impact your business?

The Australian government has announced plans to introduce a carbon pricemechanism from 1 July 2012. There will be a three-year fixed price period. The carbon price will start at $23 per tonne in 2012-13 and will be $24.15 in 2013-14 and $25.40 in 2014-15. From 1 July 2015 onwards, the carbon price will be set by the market. Under the plan, Australia will cut 159 million tonnes a year of carbon pollution from its atmosphere by 2020 - the equivalent of taking over 45 million cars off the road.

In the article below, Elisa de Wit, Anthony Hobley, Noni Shannon and Dominic Adams from law firm Norton Rose Australia outline the impact of the carbon pricing mechanism on businesses.

The carbon pricing mechanism has far-reaching implications for business, including those businesses operating in Australia and those investing in Australia. With greater regulation and transition in the economy, those businesses that can more effectively and efficiently manage the cost of their emissions can use that advantage to either lower the cost of their product or service, gaining market share, or can maintain the cost of their product or service, increasing profit margins. With this in mind, our analysis will focus on some of the key issues relevant to those sectors which will have a liability under the mechanism, including:

• Implications for business and investment certainty
• International linking, offsets use and hedging opportunities
• The treatment of transport fuels

Implications for business and investment certainty

There is a clear transition from the fixed price period to the flexible price cap and trade period, which is to occur on 1 July 2015. Further, there is no process for the review or assessment of whether the transition should be deferred (as had been previously foreshadowed by the MPCCC in their initial outline for the mechanism released in February). This will provide critical certainty as to when market participants can expect the transition to be made and when they can expect to begin managing their carbon liabilities in accordance with the rules set out for the flexible price period. The existence of the price collar, in the first three years of the flexible price period, in form of a price ceiling and price floor, although not providing long-term price certainty, will provide short-term certainty that the price will not fluctuate beyond those set price parameters if the market rules require adjustment. While not ideal from a market efficiency perspective, it would seem to be a sensible interim measure to provide obligated businesses with some initial comfort that prices will not spike and investors that prices will not collapse as happened in Phase I of the EU ETS. However, the access to domestic and international offsets also provides a ‘safety valve’ against price spikes. The CCA will conduct its first full review of the mechanism by 31 December 2016, and its second full review of the mechanism by 31 December 2018. These two reviews will likely provide the flexibility required to respond to adjustments required in the market rules to maintain certainty and integrity in the mechanism.

The mechanism effectively provides two forward cost curves for the price of carbon; a cost curve based on the permit caps set out in regulations, with a five-year price horizon, and a default position cost curve in the event that Parliament rejects the regulations. The default position cost curve will be the marginal abatement cost of reducing emissions to 5% below 2000 levels by 2020, and projected in a linear fashion beyond 2020. This provides a legislated bottom line for the setting of caps, providing business and industry with clarity and certainty in relation to the expected levels of scarcity of carbon permits in supply, allowing them to extrapolate a carbon price out well beyond 2020 and in line with the time scales of investment in major infrastructure.

The creation of a number of independent bodies charged with key policy input functions for the market, including the setting of caps and the ongoing assessment of industry assistance measures, is likely to reduce the chance that those policy inputs will fluctuate based on the position of the government of the day. The policy detail released on Sunday 10 July sets out clearly the criteria for assessment of these key issues, giving the market key and pre-emptive indicators of matters in the real world that will impact on decision making in relation to the parameters of the market. It is important to note, however, that these independent bodies have advisory functions only. Government is required to publicly respond to the advice, but may ultimately make its own decision. However, the process allows for greater transparency of these review processes, and therefore scrutiny (and in all likelihood consistency) of decision making.

International linking, offsets use and hedging opportunities

The ability to use Kyoto-compliant carbon offsets created under the Carbon Farming Initiative (CFI) for 5% of an entity’s compliance in the initial fixed price phase will create an immediate boost in investment to aspects of land sector that can produce those units, including reforestation and avoided deforestation investments and, from 1 January 2013, all other CFI project types. The key issue, however, will be the limited supply of those offsets. The CFI is an emerging project based offsetting scheme, still before Parliament in Bill form, with only limited development of the critical rules that govern the management of projects. The early identification and investment in such projects will be important for reducing, in part, the cost of compliance in the fixed price period, and critical for the reduction of greater proportions of the cost of compliance in the flexible price period. Supply will remain a critical issue into the flexible price period, where there will be unlimited use domestic offsets and a consequent high demand for them (with associated price implications).

The proposed rules surrounding quantitative limits on international offset usage within the market mandate that at least 50% of a liable party’s compliance must be met from domestic permits or offsets, out to 2020, with no restrictions thereafter. The position after 2020 will be subject to a review to be conducted in 2016. The rationale would appear to envision the progressive exposure of the mechanism to the international price on carbon, which is likely to develop into a global shadow price of emissions as markets develop. This, along with a number of other market design elements, points to an intention to ultimately link the mechanism directly with existing and future markets such as the EU ETS, the NZ ETS and other emerging markets in the Asia Pacific region.

The proposed qualitative restrictions on international offsets usage accord largely with the restrictions currently in place in the EU ETS. The government, however, may disallow the use of a particular type of international unit at any time, to ensure the environmental integrity of the market. Units disallowed will only be available for compliance in the year that the disallowance occurred. This is a significant departure from the position in the EU ETS, where such units may be used for the balance of the current phase of the EU ETS, which may be up to eight years in length. For business investing in projects directly, or for emissions reducing project developers, this raises a key area of uncertainty which may affect the viability of an investment. That is, the uncertainty that given only one year’s notice their forward investments may be unable to produce offsets available for compliance under the mechanism.

It will be important as the market develops and when making long-term investments to keep abreast of trends and developments in both international rules regulating emissions markets, and of the development of emissions trading rules in existing and emerging domestic and regional markets. These trends will provide key insights into the future of regulation in this mechanism, and identifying potential risks and opportunities early can lead to a more effective management of emissions costs.

The treatment of transport fuels

The mechanism will extend to most emissions from business transport and non-transport use of liquid fuels. The only exclusions will be light vehicles, households and the agriculture, forestry and fishery industries.

Transport fuels will not be covered directly under the mechanism. Rather, the carbon price will be applied by reducing business fuel tax credits by an amount equivalent to that of placing the carbon price on liquid fuel emissions. For domestic aviation, however, the domestic aviation fuel excise will be increased by an amount equivalent to the effect of placing the carbon price on aviation fuel, as fuel tax credits are not available for aviation fuels. Adjustments to credits and excise will be made annually during the fixed price period and then every six months (based on the average carbon price over the previous six months) during the flexible price phase.

Although this approach is perhaps necessary as a result of the carve-outs of household, primary industry and light commercial fuels use, it will significantly reduce the options available to the transport industry for managing their forward carbon liabilities through strategic hedging investments. Rather, the primary opportunities to reduce emissions liabilities will be through investment in efficiency measures (including both processes and fleet) and through the use of biofuels. Ethanol, biodiesel and renewable diesel will not incur fuel tax credit reductions or changes to excise as these fuels are zero rated under international accounting rules.

The government has also signalled that it intends to pursue extending the mechanism to heavy on-road transport from 1 July 2014 to ensure consistent treatment across the whole of the freight sector. This should effectively maintain competition neutrality between the various forms of transport. This measure was not, however, agreed to by the Multi-Party Climate Change Committee and has therefore been excluded from the mechanism at this point in time.

Opportunities for investment in cost-effective biofuels are likely to arise not only through the increased incentives for their use under these changes to excise and fuel tax credits for transportation fuels, but also through the significant funding provided to renewable energy investment under the package. This package will include the continuation of the Australian Biofuels Research Institute, and the creation of the $10bn CEFC which will provide significant opportunities for venture capital and innovative finance risk mitigation opportunities for biofuels and other private investors and product developers.

The Productivity Commission has been charged with undertaking a review of fuel excise arrangements, including an examination of the merits of a regime based explicitly and precisely on the carbon and energy content of fuels. No date has been given, however, for this review, nor has it been identified what the consequences will be from the findings of the review. The required changes to the fuel tax credits and excise is to be based on the specific emissions intensities of the fuels. It would seem appropriate, therefore, that this be done and any issues resolved by government before the commencement of the mechanism to ensure certainty of its application to the transport sector. The full article can be found here: http://www.nortonrose.com/knowledge/publications/53632.